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THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DISCLOSURE STUDY

A.A. SOMMER, Jr. *

The Report of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC' or 'Commission') Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, completed in November 1977,
had its origins in a number of circumstances. In recent years there has developed
significant research with respect to the manner in which securities markets operate.
The thrust of many of these studies, particularly those concerned with the so-called
'efficient market hypothesis' and the 'random walk theory', suggests that so-called
'fundamental research', that is, the examination of data concerning issuers, movements in the market, macro-economic and industry information and the like, yields
no better investment results than simple chance. I The purported reason for this is
that, according to the efficient market hypothesis, information is so rapidly assimilated in the price of a security that there is no opportunity for anyone to profit
from an examination of economic and corporate data. 2 This has led to the conviction among many that the only sensible investment policy is to assemble a diversified portfolio and then simply hold it. 3 This theory, while certainly not universally
accepted, nonetheless appears to be supported by a number of empirical studies. 4
Also of importance were studies by economists which suggested that the system
of investor protection enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1933 and 1934 has not
provided any provable benefit to investors. Professor George J. Stigler of the
University of Chicago, in 1964, on the basis of his researches, contended that the
Securities Act of 1933, which required the registration of securities prior to
distribution and the use of a prospectus with extensive and mandated contents, had
really not reduced the level of fraud upon the public. 5 Professor George J. Benston
of the University of Rochester concluded that the requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 did not provide new information and hence such filings were
simply superfluous. 6
In addition to these scholarly criticisms, there has risen in the U.S. in recent
years significant criticism of the SEC-administered disclosure system by users of the
information, 7 the providers of it (issuers) 8 and others involved in the disclosure
process. User criticisms have been varied. Individual investors contend that the
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information which is disclosed is often too complex for their comprehension. 9
Professional investors and institutional investors have been critical because in their
estimation much useful information has been denied them by Commission policies,
for instance, forward-looking information such as projections, estimates, and the
like. 10 Issuers have complained about the steadily increasing burdens upon them;
probably this criticism reached its highest point as the result of the Commission's
requirement that there be disclosed in a footnote to financial statements information concerning the impact of inflation upon fixed assets and inventories. "
Finally, there has been rising in the U.S. in the last half-decade increasing
frustration with the complexity and the burden of governmental regulation. 12 This
has become a bipartisan issue, with Republicans and Democrats vying to identify
themselves as the true patrons of deregulation.
As a consequence of all these forces, as well as others, in January 1976 the
Commission established an Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. Advisory
committees are fairly common in the U.S. and are specifically authorized by
statute. 13 This Committee consisted initially of 17 members, none of whom,
except the Chairman - the writer - for a period of three months before his resignation from the Commission, were then associated with the Commission. Before
completion of the work of the Committee, one member became Chairman of the
Commission. A full-time staff of eight to ten people worked on the study throughout its course, preparing materials for the Committee, interviewing various participants in the disclosure system, and drafting the final Report for consideration by
the Committee.
The Commission's charge to the Committee was
c.....

(1) to identify the characteristics and functions of the present system of

corporate disclosure and the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
within that system;
(2) to assess the costs of the present system of corporate disclosure and to weigh
those costs against the benefits it produces;
(3) to articulate the objectives of a system of corporate disclosure and to measure
the Commission's present disclosure policies against those objectives;
(4) if necessary, to formulate recommendations to the Commission for adjustments
to Commission policies to better effectuate those objectives". 14
The study was conducted through several means. Extensive questionnaires were
prepared for issuers, institutional investors, financial analysts, individual investors,
information disseminators and others involved in the process. These were
supplemented by extensive face-to-face interviews. The data secured through these
techniques is summarized in the Report of the Committee.
In addition to this original research, the staff reviewed the extensive literature
which has developed concerning disclosure and markets. In addition to that, large
amounts of this literature were distributed to members of the Committee, and the
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meetings provided clear evidence that much of it had been carefully considered by
the Committee members. The Committee members themselves were a rich resource
of experience and information. On the Committee were attorneys, accountants,
financial analysts, academics, economists, businessmen and investors.
It is fair to say that the Report of the Committee received mixed reviews. Many
had hoped that it would recommend a substantial dismantling of the disclosure
system which had been developed since 1933 by the Commission. Others were
disappointed that it did not draw tighter disclosure requirements in certain areas,
such as management forecasts of operating results. However, there was widespread
satisfaction with the Report and a considerable measure of agreement with its conclusions.
The basic conclusions of the Committee were these.
First, the Committee recognized that in any society needs and demands will
exceed available resources. When that is the case, as it universally is, it is necessary
that the scarce resources be allocated. It is axiomatic that such allocation will be
best achieved if those involved in allocation decisions have the benefit of reliable,
timely and sufficient information. Thus, in making investment decisions, investors
are likeliest to make efficient allocations of resources if they have available
information with those characteristics. The Committee therefore concluded that it
is essential to a well-ordered society and to the efficient allocation of resources that
there be a system by which sufficient and reliable information reaches investors in
as timely a fashion as is practicable. Is
The Committee concluded that the interplay between companies and analysts the demands of analysts for information, and the acquiescence by the corporations
in those demands in an effort to gain popular acceptance for their securities - is
not a sufficient force to assure the timely dissemination of reliable and sufficient
information. That being the case, it was concluded that there had to be as a part of
the system a mandatory force which would make determinations with regard to
standards of reliability and sufficiency and with respect to appropriate timeliness of
dissemination, which would structure a mechanism within which such standards
would be achieved, and which would enforce the standards. Looking at the
experience and the expertise of the Commission, the Committee concluded that it
was the most appropriate agency to carry out those functions. 16
Underlying this series of propositions, of course, was the conviction of the
Committee, based upon staff research and upon the experience of members of the
Committee, that there is value in fundamental research and that superior investment results can be accomplished by the utilization of issuer-originated and other
information. 17 While it is true that in a society like that of the U.S., large amounts
of information concerning many issuers are quickly disseminated among decisionmakers, still it was concluded there is room for superior judgment, and superior
results, based upon such information. Further, while rapid dissemination of information is characteristic of companies whose securities have large markets and wide
acceptance, it is not necessarily true of companies less followed by the investment
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community. Beyond that, of course, the efficient market hypothesis assumes the
availability of information, but it makes no statement with regard to the
characteristics that information should have. The market for a security will be
efficient even if all of the information available about the issuer is false. Thus, in
order to have efficient allocation of resources, it is necessary that there be qualities
in the marketplace in addition to simple efficiency.
The Committee concluded - again, this is axiomatic - that experienced
investment decision-makers do not expect to, and do not, make their decisions
solely on the basis of the information which is provided as a consequence of SEC
mandates. 18 Investment decision-makers, in making portfolio decisions, take into
account much information that is not contained in SEC documents, e.g., the state
of markets in general, information concerning the economy, forecasts concerning
economic trends, data with regard to the world economy, information concerning
the industry in which the portfolio candidate operates, and a host of other information. It has sometimes been charged that the Commission administers the securities
laws as if the information contained in its mandated documents constituted all that
was necessary for sound investment decision-making. 19 The Committee repudiated
such a notion. 20 Having done so, it then considered whether it would be appropriate to expand the universe of information which should be included in SEC
filings and prospectuses to embrace such information. It was determined this was
not practicable, that such information was now available through many sources and
that incorporating it in SEC documents would further lengthen and complicate
documents already frequently criticized because of their size and complexity. 2 1
The Committee addressed the question whether the Commission's requirements
should be designed in a manner that would serve the needs of a broad spectrum of
investors. The Committee in this respect concluded:
The proposed statement [to be issued by the SEC concerning its objectives] recognizes that
corporate filings need not be, and are unlikely to be, readily understandable in total by
uninformed investors. The Commission should emphasize disclosure of information useful to
reasonably knowledgeable investors willing to make the effort needed to study the disclosures,

leaving to disseminators the development of simplified formats and summaries usable by less
experienced and less knowledgeable investors. 22

Thus, the Committee did not believe that the Commission should design a variety of formats and degrees of summarization to serve the diverse needs of various
investors. It is evident that the sophistication and knowledge of investors varies
broadly, from the small, occasional, 100-share purchaser (or even the odd-lotter)
through the sophisticated portfolio managers. The Committe believed that by
having the Commission concentrate on the needs of sophisticated investors, the
needs of other types of investors would be adequately served through the many private services which collect, synthesize, summarize and comment upon data concerning issuers. 23 Among these are financial newspapers, investor services, and
brokerage firm reports. It is possible for virtually any investor to secure an abun-
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dance of information which has been formatted in a way that is usable by him.
Beyond that, our survey indicated considerable reliance by small investors upon
their brokers to provide them with information and to assist them in making investment decisions. 24 Thus, the Committee believed that the best situation for all
investors is the one which combines the efforts of the Commission to make sure
that there is a sizable pool of reliable, timely information with those of private
enterprises which draw on such a pool in rendering their services to the broad spectrum of investor sophistication. This is not a new notion; it can be found in the
legislative history of the Securities Acts 2s and was remarked upon shortly after
their enactment by then Professor, later Chairman of the SEC, later Supreme Court
Justice, William 0. Douglas. 26
While it was concluded that often the information contained in SEC filings with
regard to publicly-held companies had been disclosed and disseminated earlier, still
it was felt that those filings served significant purposes and had considerable value. 2'
First, they assure an equality of access to all investors. Second, in some cases
SEC requirements elicit information which is not routinely disseminated outside
the SEC system but which is of importance to knowledgeable investors. Finally, the
requirement of filing with the SEC, with such filings potentially subject to harsh
liabilities if false, has the effect of disci1lining the entire disclosure process, not
only the filings themselves, but all disclosure by corporations. For instance, a corporation knowing that its earnings will have to be disclosed in a formal filing will,
when it announces such earnings earlier, be quite cautious to be sure that it is not
embarrassed and exposed to liability by an inconsistent filing.
The Cornmitte also concluded that the Commission should administer the system primarily for the purpose of providing useful information to investors and potential investors in companies. 28 Thus it should not try to use its powers to compel
disclosure concerning, for instance, social or environmental matters, hiring practices, and the like, unless it could be shown that such matters were material 3to
29
and litigation 0
investors. There has been in the U.S. considerable pressure
seeking to cause the Commission to use its powers to satisfy the desires of those
with intense social concerns for information concerning corporate conduct to facilitate enforcement actions and to pressure corporations into conformity with commendable social policies. Furthermore, often the Commission is urged to require
disclosure as an indirect means of law enforcement or compelling progress toward
social objectives. 31 While the Committee recognized that often a collateral result
of a disclosure which has clear investor relevance will be a modification of corporate conduct, still the Committee felt that should not be a primary objective of the
Commission's activities.
In that regard, the Committee sought to define with more specificity than had
been done previously by the Commission and the courts what is 'material' to investors. 32 In this area, the Committee failed: it came no closer to certainty or simplicity than had others who went before it. Materiality is a remarkably difficult
concept to express with precision, and yet, even with its hazy boundaries, it is ob-
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viously a necessary standard for sorting out truly important information from that
in which even the most sophisticated investor would not have an interest.
These were the major conceptual conclusions reached by the Committee. Based
upon them, the Committee made a number of specific recommendations. The Commission, in an unusual move, perhaps to some extent attributable to the circumstance that its present Chairman, Harold M. Williams, served for over a year as a
member of the Committee before his appointment, officially reacted to the Report
of the Committee. 33 This reaction was largely affirmative and supportive, and
already the Commission has undertaken a number of actions to implement the
specific recommendations of the Committee.
Briefly, these are the principal recommendations and what the Commission has
done in response to them.
(1) The Committee recommended that the Commission should adopt a statement of its objectives in administering the system, placing emphasis, as indicated,
on investor needs. 34 The Commission determined not to adopt such a statement,
principally because it was fearful that the existence of such a statement would complicate its enforcement program and litigation work since the statement could provide a procedural weapon that might impede the Commission's work.
(2) The Committee felt that the Commission should revamp its rulemaking procedures. 3s First, it felt that there had been too much reliance upon enforcement
and other ad hoc procedures to develop disclosure policy and that the Commission
should move more quickly into a rulemaking posture when a disclosure problem
appeared, such as the improper payments problem. Secondly, the Committee felt
that the Commission should, instead of initially putting out the text of a proposed
rule, rather elicit comment at first on the basis of an analysis of the problem, its
conception of alternative solutions, and a discussion of the benefits expected to be
derived from the rule. The Commission stated its support for this position, at least
with respect to major proposals. Third, the Committee recommended that the Commission should as a part of rulemaking, particularly with respect to major rules,
establish in each case a means of monitoring the functioning, effectiveness and cost
of compliance with the rule and then, two or three years after adoption, determine
whether the rule should be abandoned or modified; again, the Commission confirmed that it will follow this policy. Fourth, the Committee recommended that
periodically the Commission should review existing rules and determine their adequacy and relevance; the Commission confirmed its similar belief and has already
done that with respect to at least one major rule.
(3) Recognizing that there are disclosures that are unique to various industries
and that not all industries can be fitted into a single Procrustean bed, the Committee recommended that the Commission should do more of what it already has done
with regard to real estate and oil and gas offerings, namely, develop in collaboration
with issuers in an industry and with analysts who follow it specific disclosure
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requirements for the particular industry; 3 6 again the Commission has already undertaken this with regard to two industries.
(4) The Committee believed that so-called 'soft information' (that is, management's estimates of future performance, appraisals of its properties, statements of
management's objectives and capital spending plans, all of which represent the kind
of information which historically the Commission has banned from prospectuses
and SEC filings) is important to investors. 3? The Committee was not ready, however - and in this there is something of an anomaly - to say that such information
should now be mandated. There still exists in the corporate community considerable opposition to such a mandate, and the Committee felt that before imposing it
upon companies which historically have been reluctant to expose themselves to
legal risks associated with incorrect forecasts, an effort should be made to accomplish the result by persuasion. As a means of doing this, the Committee recommended that the Commission should adopt a rule which might reduce the fear of
unwarranted liability, thus perhaps encouraging companies to avail themselves of
the opportunity to make projections in SEC filings and prospectuses. 3 8 Related to
the problem of forward-looking information was the Committee's recommendation
that the present requirement for analysis by management of financial information
in several Commission filings and in the annual report to shareholders be strengthened. Many commentators have felt this requirement, first required by the Commission in 1974, was one of the most far-reaching advances in disclosure policy in
many years, but have complained of shortcomings in compliance with the spirit of
it. The Commission has indicated that it intends to implement these recommendations.
(5) The Committee affirmed its support for Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 14 with respect to segmented reporting, and recommended that such
reporting should be required not only on an annual basis but quarterly as well. 9
Furthermore, it recommended that as a part of the development of industry guidelines, uniform standards for reporting with respect to product line sales within an
industry should be developed. Finally, the Committee recommended that in the
narrative parts of disclosure documents there should be similarly segmented reporting, as, for instance, in reporting on backlog, plant facilities, and the like. The Commission has indicated its concurrence with these recommendations, with the exception that, consistent with the action taken by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, it has deferred action with regard to quarterly reporting pending completion
of the FASB's study of interim reporting. 40
(6) The Committee recommended that the Commission should, with respect to
disclosures in proxy statements to existing shareholders, develop additional disclosures which will "... taken as a whole, ... strengthen the ability of boards of

directors to operate as independent, effective monitors of management perfor-
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mance and that -will provide investors with a reasonable understanding of the organization and role of the board". 41 The Commission has recently completed extensive hearings addressing the problem of corporate governance 42 and it appears that
out of those hearings will come rule recommendations that may reflect the recommendations of the Committee.
In addition to the foregoing, the Committee made a number of technical recommnendations which it hopes will result in simplification of certain filings with the
Commission through such techniques as incorporation by reference. 41 It also
recommended that the Commission have a public proceeding to determine whether
the disclosure burden on small companies might somehow or other be reduced.
The Commission has now held such hearings. 45 The Committee approached
even such mundane matters as the way in which the Commission maintains its
files, and recommended changes there. 46
There were areas in which the Committee had hoped to accomplish more than it
did. One of its objectives had been to identify the costs and the benefits of the disclosure system. 4 7 The Committee sought earnestly to do this and to the disappointment of some members of the Committee 4 8 had to confess that it simply did
not have the resources or imagination to accomplish that. About the only hard
figures the Committee was able to develop with regard to the costs of SEC compliance were auditors' fees and lawyers' fees, and even there imbedded in those figures
was such a variety of services that it was difficult to separate out those directly
attributable to SEC compliance. 49 When the endeavor turned to internal costs, it
was apparent that no useful or reliable data could be developed. Obviously the difficulties of determining the benefits of the disclosure system were even more complex: how does one measure the value of integrity of markets, protection of investors, prevention of improvident investments and so on? It is hoped that this effort
will not be abandoned and that scholars will continue the effort to develop techniques that might permit a better resolution of this problem.
The Committee did in its recommendations with respect to rule-making exhort
the Commission to, at least with respect to major new rules, establish a monitoring
method to ascertain costs and benefits of a new rule. 5o The Committee felt that
such prospective cost-benefit analysis might be feasible, as contrasted with an effort
to evaluate present costs and benefits of the entire system.
In another area this writer also felt that the Committee fell short of its mission.
He would have liked to have seen the Committee develop further its concepts with
regard to the role of proxy disclosure. A tremendous amount of effort is expended
in making disclosures to shareholders, theoretically to permit them to make
informed voting decisions. The simple, unassailable fact is that, in the absence of a
proxy contest - and those are extremely rare - management is almost invariably
overwhelmingly reelected by the shareholders. However, the information that is
disseminated as a consequence of the proxy requirements serves an extremely important purpose. It is disclosure to the general public of important information con'4
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cerning the company. Furthermore, it is of assistance to present shareholders and
potential shareholders in assessing the desirability of an investment in the corporation. Thus, proxy disclosure may well have as its true value and justification assisting
the investment process. If the Commission addressed that function more explicity, it
might be able to develop a more meaningful and useful set of disclosures to be disseminated through the proxy-soliciting mechanism.
While all members of the Committee, save one, signed the Report, a total of six
expressed reservations in one degree or another with its conclusions or analysis.
Interestingly, with one exception, each of the six commented on different aspects
of the study; thus, there was no dissenting 'bloc' united in dissent to the substance
of the report. The dissents varied: one member faulted the study for insufficient
attention to cost-benefit analysis; s1 another for failing to lighten disclosure requirements; 12 another for drawing too tightly the restriction on the Commission's disclosure rule-making process; -3 another because of the particulars of the Committee's recomendations with respect to projections; 54 another for a variety of finite
reasons. 55
The most encouraging consequence of the Committee's efforts has been the
recognition by the Commission of the merit of the proposals. As indicated, the
formal response by the Commission to the Report is unique and represents a commitment that the Report, unlike so many others, will not be permitted to gather
dust on a shelf.
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